By Jeff Price

It's three years later and "The 9/11 Commission Report" is out. Are we any safer? Have we learned anything? Will we do anything different to prevent the next 9/11?

The benefit of the report was its in-depth look at how and why the terrorist attacks occurred, from the terrorists' motives to the shortcomings of the U.S. intelligence and aviation security system in detecting or preventing the attacks.

It is obvious from the report that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) possessed limited intelligence assessment capabilities. And that the FAA was out of the loop in regards to receiving actionable intelligence. In fact, the only warnings the FAA issued during the summer of 2001 were to be aware of potential hijack or bombing activity of a traditional nature, not suicidal attacks.

Although several pieces of intelligence made inferences about a potential hijack-suicide attack, even the intelligence agencies collecting the data had not put enough information together to conclude that an attack was in the works.

And while the Bush Administration had received nearly 30 briefings on Al Qaeda in 2001 prior to Sept. 11, including one just prior to the attack, none of the warnings seemed different from previous alerts.

The commission's aviation security recommendations call for improving passenger and baggage screening, establishing achievable screener performance standards, researching practical and cost-effective ways of defending the aviation system, strengthening the layered security system specifically with the use of "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists, and incorporating biometric screening into airline travel.

Most people agree that the U.S. aviation security system was instantly improved after 9/11 when the FAA changed its policy of allowing knives less than four inches long on board aircraft. The weapons used by the 9/11 hijackers were FAA-approved items. Beyond that, there is much debate regarding the effectiveness of the government's actions to protect air travelers from terrorism since 9/11.

The commission handed the Transportation Security Administration harsh criticism, saying it has failed to meet congressional deadlines in developing an integrated strategic plan to protect the transportation industry and pointed out that major vulnerabilities still exist in air cargo security and general aviation security.

The commission wants Congress to establish and hold the TSA to deadlines on developing and implementing these plans, though several of the commission's recommendations are already works-in-progress. For example the new Secure Flight system cross-checks passenger manifests with terrorist watch lists; biometrics are being tested at airports across the country; and checked baggage screening systems continue to be implemented.

The problem with bureaucracies is that they can churn away for decades and not make the necessary changes for an emerging reality. The intelligence community continues using a Cold War model and the commission makes clear that it's time to build a new model, instead of applying some glue to the old one.

Prior to 9/11, checked baggage wasn't screened, passengers were allowed to carry knives and pilots were told to cooperate with hijackers to land aircraft safely. In the post-9/11 world, checked baggage is screened in some form, passengers can't carry knives and many pilots are armed and trained to defend the flight deck at all costs. But as the commission concluded, we've spent 90 percent of our money fighting the last war. Will we be ready for the next?

Jeff Price, an assistant professor of aerospace science at Metropolitan State College of Denver, has more than 16 years in the aviation industry having served as DIA's assistant security director and airport manager at Jefferson County Airport. He has just finished writing the first comprehensive textbook on aviation security since the 9/11 attacks.